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Fear of an Undeterrable Other 
Fredrick E. Vars* 
ABSTRACT 
America is presently fighting a war on terror and a war on sex 
offenders. In each, the government openly detains hundreds of 
individuals not for what they have done, but for what they might 
do. Some warn that this greatest restriction on liberty may expand 
to other types of people. This Article examines the risk of such 
expansion by putting our current wars in historical perspective. 
The two main conclusions are: (1) some categories of people 
detained in prior periods are not being detained today; and (2) the 
risk of expansion is real but lower than previously suggested. 
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America is currently fighting at least two “wars”: a war on 
terror1 and a war on sex offenders.2 In each, the government has 
openly employed indefinite preventive detention, locking up 
thousands not for what they have done, but for what they might do. 
Commentators warn that this controversial strategy may be 
expanded to encompass other types of people.3 For example, the 
preventive detention of “suspected terrorists” at Guantanamo could 
expand to individuals suspected of other violent crimes.4 How real 
is that threat?5 
This Article assesses the risk of such “mission creep”6—
specifically, the expansion of indefinite preventive detention 
beyond terrorists and sex offenders. As others have observed, the 
law in these areas is relatively elastic, so the potential for creep is 
real.7 In other words, the risk is not zero. To be more precise, one 
needs a theory for when the government engages in indefinite 
preventive detention. Such a theory will be more persuasive if it 
has explanatory power across time, as well as in multiple 
situations, including the wars on terror and sex offenders. 
 It turns out that neither of these wars is wholly new. The 
present war on terror dates back to September 11, 2001. Before 
that, the last major attack on American soil was at Pearl Harbor on 
                                                                                                             
 1. President Obama has said that the war on terror must end, but pointedly 
did not declare it over. Peter Baker, Reviving Debate on Nation’s Security, 
Obama Seeks To Narrow Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2013, at A1. 
 2. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on 
Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2010). 
 3. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected 
Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 728, 749 (2009) [hereinafter Cole, 
Out of the Shadows]; ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL 
PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 94, 101 (2006). 
 4. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3, at 728. 
 5. This Article is primarily descriptive, not normative. One exception is 
the use of the word “threat” here rather than a neutral word like “possibility.” 
Criticisms of sex offender commitment appear in Fredrick E. Vars, Delineating 
Sexual Dangerousness, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 855 (2013) [hereinafter Vars, 
Dangerousness], and Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of 
Sex Offenders, 44 CONN. L. REV. 161 (2011) [hereinafter Vars, Rethinking]. For 
a critical analysis of both “wars” in an historical perspective, see Eric Janus, The 
Preventive State: When Is Prevention of Harm Harmful?, in HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC PROTECTION 316 (Mike Nash & Andy Williams, eds. 2010). 
 6. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3, at 749. The term “mission 
creep” generally refers to the expansion of a mission beyond its original 
objectives. Jim Hoagland, Prepared for Non-Combat, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 
1993, at A29. My focus is on creep to other categories of people, not on creep 
within a category. 
 7. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3; JANUS, supra note 3, at 94, 101. 




December 7, 1941. In fact, the government engaged in widespread, 
indefinite preventive detention after both attacks.8 In contrast, the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 did not result in preventive 
detention.9 These three events will frame this Article’s discussion 
of national security detentions.  
The current wave of sex offender commitment started in 1990; 
a previous wave started in the late 1930s.10 Sex offender 
commitment is often justified as an extension of mental illness 
civil commitment.11 Because these two types of commitment share 
a mental defect component, they are considered together in this 
Article. Sticking to cases where fear is greatest, the mental illness 
example employed in this Article is the 2007 Virginia Tech mass 
shooting, which also led to an expansion of preventive detention 
authority. 
A complete history of even one of these six events is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Rather, the goal is to distill the key 
factors that contribute to preventive detention. The touchstone is 
Fear of an Undeterrable Other.12 Fear is a relatively 
straightforward concept, but it is not always correlated with risk.13 
Other is a term of art. In this context, it means an identifiable 
minority group that is perceived negatively by the majority.14 
Undeterrable is used loosely to describe anyone with a defect in 
control or other attribute that weakens the normal deterrent effect 
of civil and criminal penalties.15 Deterrence is the preferred default 
option because, if it works, the government has to incarcerate 
fewer people than it would need to preventively detain.16 Although 
presented here separately, these three factors can be mutually 
reinforcing. 
Broad fluctuations in detention practices appear to be driven 
mainly by fluctuating levels of fear. The scope of such practices, 
                                                                                                             
 8. See infra Parts I.A, I.C. By “indefinite preventive detention,” I mean a 
deprivation of liberty of movement premised on a perceived risk and not limited 
in duration. 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. See generally Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of 
Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders 
in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69 (2000); see also infra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 11. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997). 
 12. See JANUS, supra note 3, at 108 (referencing a feeling of being 
“threatened by an outsider group”). 
 13. Vars, Dangerousness, supra note 5, at 878–82. 
 14. Cf. Natsu Taylor Saito, Interning the “Non-Alien” Other: The Illusory 
Protections of Citizenship, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2005). 
 15. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 140 (2006). 
 16. See infra Part III. 




however, is sensitive to then-operative notions of Otherness. Here, 
there is some room for optimism, or at least two silver linings to 
the current resurgence of preventive detention. Tens of thousands 
of Japanese-American citizens were interned during World War 
II.17 It appears that only a few American citizens were detained 
after 9/11.18 Citizenship trumped ethnic and cultural Otherness. 
Less appreciated is the status of homosexuals in the history of sex 
offender commitment. Many were detained in the first wave based 
on consensual adult sex; very few, if any, in the second.19 Our 
culture no longer views lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
people as a sufficiently threatening Other to detain preventively. 
Muslim and Arab-American citizens and homosexuals should 
probably be thankful that they do not live in an earlier era. 
Should we nonetheless be worried about mission creep? That 
post-9/11 detentions focused almost exclusively on non-citizens is 
hopeful.20 A terror attack would likely have to be larger than 9/11 
to lead to widespread detentions of citizens. The more likely threat 
is fear induced by a domestic crime wave or even a few horrific 
crimes, as in the case of sex offenders. Sex offenders have been 
called the most reviled Other.21 That kind of antipathy, thankfully, 
does not materialize overnight. But other categories of dangerous 
people may still be at risk. Fear of an undeterrable Other is not 
presently sufficient to justify overt indefinite detention of gang 
members, for example. But such a conclusion is historically 
contingent and could change with rapid gang expansion and 
increased gang violence.22 
Because the primary driver is fear, Part I outlines three moments 
in history when national security was in peril: (1) the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, (2) the Oklahoma City bombing, and (3) 9/11. The first and 
third engendered large-scale, indefinite preventive detention. In 
both, there was fear of an undeterrable Other. This was not the case 
after Oklahoma City. Part II examines two types of out-of-control 
criminals: (1) sex offenders and (2) some individuals with mental 
illness. Undeterrability is thought to distinguish them from other 
dangerous people. And, when combined with frightening crimes, 
the government has repeatedly authorized the indefinite preventive 
                                                                                                             
 17. See infra Part I.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.C. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in 
Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 297 (2003).  
 21. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that Hoover called 
sex offenses the “most loathsome of all the vast army of crime”). 
 22. Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 65 (2004).  




detention of these two types of individuals. Part III integrates the 
first two sections to answer the central question about mission 
creep, concluding that it is possible but perhaps less likely than 
others have suggested. At least one of the critical requirements of 
fear, undeterrability, and Otherness is missing in the most currently 
plausible candidates for expanded preventive detention. 
I. NATIONAL SECURITY 
A. World War II 
On the morning of December 7, 1941, hundreds of Japanese 
aircraft surprise-attacked the American military base at Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii.23 Over a dozen ships and over three hundred 
aircraft were sunk, damaged, or destroyed. In addition, 2,402 
Americans were killed and 1,247 wounded.24 Over 97% of the 
dead and wounded were members of the military.25 
That night, the FBI took into custody those whom it deemed to 
be the most dangerous German, Italian, and Japanese citizens. 
“Over the next several months, the FBI detained 9,121 enemy 
aliens in this manner. Approximately 5,100 (57 percent) were 
Japanese nationals, 3,250 (36 percent) were German nationals, and 
650 (7 percent) were Italian nationals.”26 Individualized hearings 
led to the release of more than half of these detainees by June 30, 
1943.27  
But preventive detention did not stop there. On February 19, 
1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066, 
which in vague terms authorized the exclusion of “any persons” 
from military areas. Over the next eight months, under the 
direction of West Coast Commander General John DeWitt, almost 
120,000 persons of Japanese descent were ordered to leave their 
homes in California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona. Two-
thirds of those forcibly relocated into internment camps were 
                                                                                                             
 23. Attack on Pearl Harbor, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor, archived at http://perma.cc/GJ65-DS36 (last updated Aug. 
14, 2014) (citing PATRICK WATSON, WATSON’S REALLY BIG WWII ALMANAC, 
VOLUME II: JULY TO DECEMBER 592 (2007)). See generally WALTER LORD, DAY OF 
INFAMY (1957). 
 24. Attack on Pearl Harbor, supra note 23; LORD, supra note 23.  
 25. Attack on Pearl Harbor, supra note 23; LORD, supra note 23.  
 26. GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: 
1790 TO THE PRESENT 65 (2007) [hereinafter STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY].  
 27. Id. at 66. 




American citizens.28 This exclusion persisted until December 17, 
1944.29 
Why did this happen? The official justification in 1942 was 
that there was no quick way to distinguish loyal from disloyal 
Japanese.30 The United States Supreme Court accepted this 
justification in upholding the internment.31 However, official 
thinking has since changed. In 1982, a Congressional commission 
concluded: 
The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not 
justified by military necessity, and the decisions which 
followed from it—detention, ending detention and ending 
exclusion—were not driven by analysis of military 
conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these 
decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of 
political leadership.32 
The Japanese internment supports this Article’s thesis that the 
government engages in indefinite preventive detention in response 
to fear of an undeterrable Other. Fear of an Other is obviously 
consistent with the modern view that internment was driven by 
“race prejudice” and “war hysteria.” Undeterrability is implicit in 
the contemporaneous rationale of disloyalty: the threat of sanctions 
could not deter a loyal subject of Japan if the subject had been 
called upon to assist its war effort.  
Fear. After Pearl Harbor, fear of a Japanese attack on the West 
Coast was intense.33 Japanese forces quickly compiled a string of 
surprising victories against the U.S. and its allies. In January 1942, 
Congressman Homer Angell of Oregon warned: “We must wake 
up, and if we do not wake up and protect ourselves from this 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id.  
 29. Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians, in PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED ch. 8 (1982) [hereinafter Commission 
Report], available at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/personal 
_justice_denied/contents.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/VRH9-KAGV.  
 30. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1944). 
 31. Id. at 214. See David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial 
Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2568–
69 (2003) [hereinafter Cole, Judging the Next Emergency] (citing Korematsu as 
evidence that “courts are ineffective as guardians of liberty when the general 
public is clamoring for security”). Justice Scalia agrees. See Audrey McAvoy, 
Scalia Says Internment Ruling Could Happen Again, AP (Feb. 3, 2014, 8:06 
PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/scalia-says-internment-ruling-could-happen-
again, archived at http://perma.cc/VUC6-6FKR. 
 32. Commission Report, supra note 29, at 5, 8, 67–68.  
 33. Id. 




menace something infinitely worse than Pearl Harbor will be 
enacted on our very shores.”34 Fear motivated the internment.35 
Other. The Japanese were an identifiable and widely reviled 
Other. In January 1942, General DeWitt stated, “The Japanese race 
is an enemy race and while many second and third generation 
Japanese were born on United States soil, possessed of United 
States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized,’ the racial strains 
are undiluted.”36 On another occasion, DeWitt infamously 
proclaimed, “[A] Jap’s a Jap.”37 
Undeterrable. The content of the anti-Japanese stereotypes fed 
the perception that preventive detention was necessary. These 
stereotypes ran deep, bleeding over from earlier prejudice against 
the Chinese “yellow peril.”38 Both the Chinese and Japanese were 
viewed as “treacherous” and loyal only to their home countries.39 
After sweeping Japanese victories against Russia, a San Francisco 
paper in 1905 warned that Japanese “uncontrollable ambitions” 
threatened California.40 
Pearl Harbor fanned a burning flame of racial distrust. 
California State Senator Jack Metzger stated in February 1942: “I 
don’t believe there is a single Japanese in the world who is not 
pulling for Japan. They will spy, commit sabotage, or die if 
necessary.”41 California Attorney General Earl Warren warned of 
the “broad control” Japan had over all ethnic Japanese in 
America.42 One commentator explained: “A Japanese-American 
citizen in 1942 was easily considered ‘foreign,’ thus making 
possible the judgment that likelihood of disloyalty was high 
enough to justify wholesale internment.”43  
                                                                                                             
 34. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EDWARD N. BARNHART, & FLOYD W. MATSON, 
PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 78 (1954). 
 35. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME, 
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 290 (2004) 
[hereinafter STONE, PERILOUS TIMES] (“Certainly, this demand [for removal of 
all Japanese] was fed by fears of a large-scale Japanese invasion of the 
mainland.”); Meaghan Kelly, Note, Lock Them Up—and Throw Away the Key: 
The Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders in the United States and Germany, 
39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 551, 553 (2008) (stating that fear led to the Japanese 
internment). 
 36. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 35, at 292.  
 37. Id.  
 38. TENBROEK ET AL., supra note 34, at 19.  
 39. Id. at 20, 24, 67.  
 40. Id. at 26. 
 41. Id. at 77. 
 42. Id. at 84.  
 43. Saito, supra note 14, at 183 (2005) (quoting Neil Gotanda, “Other Non-
Whites” in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1186, 1191 (1985) (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983))). See 




In sum, fear of an undeterrable Other motivated the Japanese 
internment. 
B. Oklahoma City Bombing 
On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated an explosive-
filled truck next to a federal building in Oklahoma City.44 In all, 
168 people were killed; over 680 were injured.45 At his trial, the 
prosecution claimed that McVeigh was “motivated by hatred of the 
government” and was “in a rage over the events at Waco,” where 
two years to the day before the bombing a federal raid produced 76 
civilian casualties.46 McVeigh was not a member of any militia 
group, but he had previously attended a militia meeting.47 
Even before the bombing, some militia members believed that 
the federal government was building concentration camps to 
incarcerate citizens,48 but this assumption did not turn out to be 
true. Rather, the primary policy response to the bombing was the 
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996.49 This Act narrowed habeas corpus and broadened some 
criminal restrictions, but it did not authorize or expand preventive 
detention in any way.50 
There were obviously complicated politics at work, but the 
government’s failure to engage in large-scale, indefinite preventive 
detention after the Oklahoma City bombing should not be 
surprising. Fear of an undeterrable Other was lacking, though fear 
                                                                                                             
 
also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 97 (2003) [hereinafter COLE, ENEMY 
ALIENS]. 
 44. See Oklahoma City Bombing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Oklahoma_City_bombing, archived at http://perma.cc/7879-28U6 (last updated 
Sept. 2, 2014). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Excerpts from Closing Arguments in the Oklahoma City Bombing Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1997, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/1997/05/30/us/excerpts-from-closing-arguments-in-the-oklahoma-city-bombing 
-case.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7JGR-V6QK. 
 47. Richard Leiby, Many Militia Groups Scale Back, Distance Themselves 
from McVeigh, WASH. POST, June 14, 1997, at A08. 
 48. Kevin Mayhood, Ohio Had Eye on Radical Militia Members Before 
Bombing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), May 2, 1995, at 01A. 
 49. Oklahoma City Bombing, supra note 44. See also Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
 50. To the extent the Act targeted terrorism, it was international rather than 
domestic. Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and 
United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2844 
(2001). This is further support, though indirect, for my “Otherness” requirement. 




of terrorist attacks was no doubt elevated after the bombing. A 
week after the attack, 42% of Americans in one survey were very 
or somewhat worried that they or someone in their family would 
become a victim of a terrorist attack.51 
The deeply held beliefs of militia members might be viewed 
similarly to one’s loyalty to a home country or radical religious 
precepts. In other words, militia members may be undeterrable, but 
they are not an Other. For example, a letter to the editor of a local 
paper dismissed calls for post-9/11 internment camps as reflecting 
“war hysteria and racism aimed against foreigners”: 
After all, when Timothy McVeigh bombed an Oklahoma 
City federal building in 1995, did anyone . . . suggest that 
the militia-oriented citizenry should be forcibly detained in 
camps? Heaven forbid we should imprison anyone 
affiliated with right-wing militia groups. They may be 
armed to the teeth, but at least they’re God-fearing white 
Americans!52 
The response to the Oklahoma City bombing was to increase 
the bite of criminal sanctions, not to employ preventive detention. 
There was insufficient fear of an undeterrable Other. Despite his 
extreme beliefs, Timothy McVeigh was not an Other, because he 
was a “God-fearing white American.” Being a white citizen was 
obviously important, but so too may have been the type of God 
that he feared. He was raised Roman Catholic, though he later self-
identified as agnostic.53 Significantly, he was not Muslim.54 
C. “War on Terror” 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four 
civilian aircraft and crashed them into the World Trade Center, the 
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania.55 Overall, 2,982 people 
                                                                                                             
 51. Americans’ Fear of Terrorism in U.S. Is Near Low Point, GALLUP 
(Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/149315/americans-fear-terrorism-
near-low-point.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/6QHL-8G4C [hereinafter 
GALLUP POLL]. The comparable figure after 9/11 was 59%. See id.  
 52. Doris Mah, Internment Camps Are Wrong and Illegal, LANCASTER 
INTELLIGENCER J., Oct. 4, 2001, at A-15. 
 53. Timothy McVeigh, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy 
_McVeigh#Political_views_and_religious_beliefs, archived at http://perma.cc/L8TX-
K8JK (last updated Aug. 26, 2014). 
 54. Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective 
Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429 (2011-2012). 
 55. September 11 Attacks, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Septem 
ber_11_attacks, archived at http://perma.cc/X3KL-Y74J (last updated Sept. 1, 
2014). 




died.56 The casualties were overwhelmingly civilian, but included 
125 Pentagon employees.57 The hijackers were Muslim, members 
of al-Qaeda, and 15 were of Saudi Arabian origin.58 None were 
U.S. citizens.59 
The government immediately began detaining people under a 
variety of authorities. The greatest number of such detentions 
involved the immigration system.60 The federal government, using 
immigration law as justification, preventively detained more than 
5,000 foreign nationals, nearly all Arab or Muslim, in the first two 
years after 9/11.61 Immigration detentions are, at least in theory, 
temporary.62 Noncitizens have been detained indefinitely, 
however, at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Of 779 
total detainees, 223 remained by late September 2009.63 As of 
March 2013, 166 detainees remained.64  
The detentions of three American citizens received a great deal 
of media and legal attention.65 John Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam 
Hamdi were captured in Afghanistan.66 Lindh soon appeared in 
civilian criminal court and eventually pled guilty.67 Hamdi was 
placed in a naval brig in Virginia, incommunicado for nearly three 
years.68 He was removed to Saudi Arabia only after successfully 
challenging his confinement before the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. 
 57. STEVEN STRASSER & CRAIG R. WHITNEY, THE 9/11 INVESTIGATIONS 
392–93 (Steven Strasser ed., 2004). 
 58. September 11 Attacks, supra note 55. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American 
Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 85, 147–48 (2011). 
 61. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3, at 703.  
 62. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 63. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the 
Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 1021 (2009). 
 64. Peter Finn & Julie Tate, Guantanamo Detainees’ Frustrations 
Simmering, Lawyers and Others Say, WASH. POST. (Mar. 16, 2013) http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/guantanamo-detainees-frustrations 
-simmering-lawyers-and-others-say/2013/03/16/47fc4c0e-8d9a-11e2-b63f-53 
fb9f2fcb4 story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/V9JS-SW4Z. “Congress 
responded to the 2001 [Supreme Court case holding that immigration detentions 
must be temporary] with the USA PATRIOT Act language establishing a 
process for long-term detention of suspected alien terrorists who cannot be 
deported—provisions that have yet to face judicial test.” Klein & Wittes, supra 
note 60, at 150. 
 65. At least seven other citizens were detained as material witnesses. COLE, 
ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 43, at 39. 
 66. Saito, supra note 14, at 203. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 




Court.69 A third citizen, Jose Padilla, was first detained for a 
prolonged period, then convicted in civilian criminal court.70  
Preventive detention in the “War on Terror,” as during World 
War II, has been driven by fear of an undeterrable Other.  
Fear. The Secretary of Defense minced no words justifying the 
Guantanamo Bay detentions on fear, describing the prisoners as 
“among the most dangerous, best-trained, vicious killers on the 
face of the earth.”71 In his 2002 State of the Union Address, 
President George W. Bush spoke of “unprecedented dangers” and 
warned that tens of thousands of terrorists spread throughout the 
world were “like ticking time bombs - set to go off without 
warning.”72 The public shared these fears. Before 9/11, about a 
quarter of Americans felt very or somewhat worried that they or a 
family member could become a victim of terrorism; shortly after 
9/11, that number was 59%.73 Nearly 90% of Americans post-9/11 
thought another terrorist attack within a few months was likely.74 
Other. There is no question that the government overwhelmingly 
targeted noncitizen Arabs and Muslims for preventive detention. 
Muslim Americans—citizens and noncitizens—are Others. Indeed, 
one set of researchers contends that Muslims are uniquely, doubly 
Other, classified in the cultural, racial, and ethnic outgroups.75 A 
survey in 2004 put Muslims just above 50 on a “temperature-of-
feeling” scale, as compared with a mid-70s score for Whites and 
high 60s for Blacks, Catholics, Jews, Asian-Americans, and 
Hispanic-Americans.76 Whites considered Muslims more violent 
and less trustworthy than any other group.77 These negative 
stereotypes have been found to be significantly associated with an 
increased willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security.78 
                                                                                                             
 69. Saito, supra note 14, at 203–06.  
 70. Kirk Semple, Padilla Gets 17-Year Term for Role in Conspiracy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01 
/23/us/23padilla.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/TX9T-DUH7. 
 71. Glazier, supra note 63, at 1019.  
 72. Editorial, A War Speech, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2002, at 
C10. 
 73. GALLUP POLL, supra note 51.  
 74. Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, & Robert Y. Shapiro, Post-9/11 
Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United 
States, 1 INT’L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE 105, 114 (2007). 
 75. See generally Kerem Ozan Kalkan, Geoffrey C. Layman, & Eric M. 
Uslaner, “Bands of Others”? Attitudes Toward Muslims in Contemporary 
American Society, 71 J. POL. 847 (2009).  
 76. John Sides & Kimberly Gross, Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for 
the War on Terror, J. POL. fig.1 (forthcoming), available at http://home 
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Illegal immigrants scored even lower than Muslims on the 
aforementioned temperature scale (high 30s)—indeed, the lowest 
of any group.79 In one study conducted a year after 9/11, college 
students in the U.S.–Mexico border area felt a greater symbolic 
threat concerning Arab immigrants as compared to the much more 
numerous Mexican immigrants.80 “Arab immigrants were viewed 
with more negative affect (greater prejudice) and were perceived to 
represent a greater threat to the cultural milieu of the U.S.”81 
Japanese Americans after Pearl Harbor were deemed “foreign” 
enough to intern as Others, but Muslim Americans after 9/11 were 
(properly) not.82 
Terrorists themselves are plainly Other, described as 
“predator[s],” “inherently malevolent,” “savage[s],” “beast[s],” 
“parasite[s],” and “evil and inhuman.”83 One scholar noted: 
At its most basic level, this discursive construction of the 
depersonalized and dehumanized ‘enemy other’ can be 
seen in the commonly used derogatory terms that soldiers 
of every generation have employed. ‘Hun’, ‘Japs’, ‘gooks’, 
‘rag-heads’ and ‘skinnies’ are the means by which fellow 
human beings—who are also husbands, sons, brothers, 
friends—are discursively transformed into a hateful and 
loathsome ‘other’ who can be killed and abused without 
remorse or regret.84  
Terrorists were quickly added to this list as one of the most hated 
Others. 
Undeterrable. The strongest evidence that terrorists were 
undeterrable came from the fact that the hijackers on 9/11 
committed suicide as part of the attack. Our strongest sanction—
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the death penalty—is no deterrent to a suicide bomber.85 This may 
be one reason the terrorists were branded as “inherently malevolent 
. . . beasts.”86 Once the terrorists were dehumanized in this way, 
they were viewed as irredeemable. 
The government did not detain only known terrorists, but also 
suspected terrorists. That included the temporary detention of 
literally thousands of Arab and Muslim noncitizens.87 One 
explanation is that the stereotypes discussed above—that Muslims 
are more violent and less trustworthy than other groups—suggest 
that they may be resistant to deterrence. More to the point, one 
survey found that 43% of Americans thought Muslims were 
fanatic.88 But the connection is tighter than that. Even before 9/11, 
42% of respondents in one survey agreed with the statement that 
“Muslims belong to a religion that condones or supports 
terrorism.”89 Echoing much earlier anti-Japanese sentiment, a 1993 
anti-immigration publication warned against “Arab-born aliens 
who support terrorist activity and remain loyal to Middle East 
tyrants.”90 
II. MENTAL DEFECT 
Over two periods in American history, thousands of sex 
offenders have been detained for indeterminate terms. The stated 
justifications for such detentions have been prevention—as with 
the Japanese, Arabs, and Muslims—and also treatment.91 At least 
in the current phase, “the notion that the sex offenders are being 
medically ‘treated’ as part of this program is largely a fiction.”92 
Treatment, even when sincerely pursued, is usually ineffective.93 
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Perhaps as a result, very few sex offenders are ever released,94 
leaving prevention as the primary, and perhaps only genuine, 
justification. Hence, sex offender commitment amounts to 
indefinite preventive detention, like the national security detentions 
discussed above. The driving force—fear of an undeterrable 
Other—is also the same. 
Defenders of sex offender commitment claim that it is a modest 
expansion of traditional mental illness commitment.95 Such 
commitments require dangerousness in addition to mental illness.96 
This is a more complicated case because treatment generally is a 
valid, required, and perhaps primary motivation for commitment.97 
In other words, mental illness civil commitment is not pure 
preventive detention—it has a genuine therapeutic component. Due 
largely to better treatment and massive contraction in available 
beds, the duration of civil commitments, and hence daily census, 
has declined substantially since the 1950s.98 The modest changes 
to Virginia law described below should be viewed against this 
larger context. 
A. First-Generation Sex Offender Laws 
In the late 1930s, states began adopting what amounted to 
alternative, indeterminate sentencing programs for certain sex 
offenders.99 The consensus view of historians is that intense media 
coverage of “a series of brutal and apparently sexually motivated 
child murders” precipitated the first generation of sex offender 
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commitment laws.100 However, it may not have been quite this 
simple. One pair of researchers found that adopting states were 
predominantly urban and had recently experienced the greatest 
influx of African Americans.101 As discussed below, however, 
these alternative narratives also draw upon fear. 
Some states started with rather narrow programs, but the 
overall scope became very broad. For example, California first 
targeted just child molesters, but then expanded its program to 
basically all crimes involving sexual activity.102 California’s 
program became the “most extensively utilized program,” 
confining approximately 1,000 people each year from 1949 to 
1980.103 By the late 1960s, well over half of the states had adopted 
such laws, but only a handful retained them by 1990.104  
Most laws were broad but not mandatory, so only a subset of those 
eligible were actually detained. “In Minnesota [between 1940 and 
1960], for example, the typical commitments were for nonviolent 
behavior such as window peeping, indecent exposure, and consenting 
adult homosexuality, with three-quarters of the individuals being first-
time offenders.”105 Consensual homosexuality was the predicate for 
detention of over seven percent of persons detained in Nebraska 
between 1949 and 1956.106 Four out of the first 100 cases studied at 
the New Jersey diagnostic center under a new sexual psychopath 
law were “fixed homosexual deviates.”107 In another jurisdiction, 
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one of the first 14 cases adjudicated involved a “non-aggressive 
homosexual, convicted of passing bad checks.”108 In Minnesota, 
“[m]ost were detained for homosexual activity, not for being hard-
core sex criminals.”109 
Fear. In 1937, J. Edgar Hoover warned that the “sex fiend” had 
become a “sinister threat to the safety of American childhood and 
womanhood.”110 The fears that drove the first “sex crime panic” 
were both specific and general.111 Individual acts of sexual 
brutality, once publicized, led to demands for clamping down on 
sex crimes.112 Brutality is frightening enough, but at this moment 
in history, it activated other, deeper anxieties.  
As mentioned above, highly urbanized states tended to adopt 
sexual psychopath legislation. Closer proximity to other people meant 
more opportunity for victimization. Growing populations of another 
minority group—African Americans—were also correlated with sex 
offender commitment. Even more broadly, some have argued that the 
Cold War labeled nonconformity, including sexual nonconformity and 
homosexuality, as a threat to national security.113  
Other. Sex offenders were—and are—perceived as less than 
human. J. Edgar Hoover described the “sex fiend” as the “most 
loathsome of all the vast army of crime.”114 In affirming its first 
generation sexual psychopath law, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
described covered sex offenders as “unnaturals,” “hopelessly 
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immoral,” and “insane.”115 Such language obviously included such 
“outsider figures” as would be recognized today as “fiends and 
psychopaths, pedophiles and predators.”116 But it also included 
homosexuals: prior to the 1950s, the popular perception of the 
homosexual was “the pathological, predatory, sexually violent 
deviant.”117 
Undeterrable. Sex offenders were seen to be out of control. 
Recall that the Minnesota Supreme Court described sex offenders 
subject to detention not just as “immoral,” but “hopelessly” so.118 
This lack of control, and hence undeterrability, was a defining 
attribute of those subject to detention. “Almost every state included 
the phrase ‘utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses.’”119  
The first wave of sex offender commitment falls squarely 
within the paradigm derived from the national security context: 
overt large-scale, indefinite preventive detention in response to 
fear of an undeterrable Other. 
B. Second-Generation Sex Offender Laws 
On May 20, 1989, a young boy in Tacoma, Washington, was 
the victim of a brutal sexual attack by a man with a history of 
killing, assaulting, and kidnapping.120 The current phase of sex 
offender commitment began one year later with Washington’s 
“sexually violent predator” (SVP) act.121 This phase differed from 
the first by permitting detention after defendants had served time 
for the predicate offenses.122 
At least twenty states and the federal government have SVP 
laws.123 The Kansas statute is typical. It defines a “sexually violent 
predator” as “any person who has been convicted of or charged 
with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely 
to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.”124  
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This definition withstood constitutional challenge in the United 
States Supreme Court case of Kansas v. Hendricks.125 Five years 
later the Court clarified that “there must be proof of serious 
difficulty in controlling behavior.”126 A key statutory term is 
“sexually violent offense,” which runs the gamut from rape127 to 
“any act which . . . has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt 
to have been sexually motivated.”128 Notably, Kansas still purports 
to criminalize same-sex adult sodomy,129 but that is not separately 
listed as a “sexually violent offense” for purposes of the SVP law. 
Thousands of individuals have been detained under SVP 
laws.130 Looking just at Minnesota, it appears that current 
detainees have many more prior offenses than first generation 
detainees. During the first generation in Minnesota, three-quarters 
of detainees were first-time offenders.131 In the current wave, the 
number is flipped: three-quarters of civilly committed sex 
offenders had two or more felony convictions.132  
Few, if any, individuals have been detained pursuant to a 
current SVP law for having participated in consensual adult 
homosexual activity. Only four states were enforcing anti-sodomy 
laws against homosexuals in 2003 when the United States Supreme 
Court declared such laws unconstitutional.133 Kansas was one such 
state. There are 127 Kansas cases that contain the phrase “sexually 
violent predator.” Of these, only six also include the words 
“homosexual” or “homosexuality.”134  
In the first case, homosexual activity was cited by an expert, 
but there were also convictions for aggravated—underage or 
nonconsensual—criminal sodomy.135 The second and third cases 
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involved aggravated incest.136 The fourth case involved 
registration, not commitment.137  
The last two cases are telling. The respondent in one 
complained that repeated references to his “homosexuality” were 
improper because homosexuality is not a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder.138 The court rejected this argument not as 
stated but on the ground that the respondent admitted to being 
bisexual—which was consistent with the testimony and found by 
the lower court—so the court did not rely on his homosexual 
orientation.139 His homosexual acts, as opposed to orientation, 
were properly considered in evaluating the respondent’s risk to 
both sexes.140 In the final case, the court rejected commitment 
precisely because “it appear[ed] that the two instances of 
homosexual activity being referred to d[id] not support the position 
that he ha[d] sexually reoffended with a child.”141 In reversing, the 
Kansas Supreme Court emphasized that some of the activity 
involved an underage individual, although not a child.142 
Homosexuality was not cited as a risk factor.143 
In sum, during the first wave in Nebraska, homosexuality was 
the predicate for detention in over seven percent of cases.144 
During the second wave just across the border in Kansas, an 
admittedly non-scientific review of case law found not a single 
case in which homosexuality was a predicate for detention. More 
broadly, one commentator concluded that during the second wave 
of sex offender commitment, unlike the first, “[m]ental hospitals 
[were] not used as warehouses for homosexuals.”145 
Fear. Sex offender commitment laws were adopted almost 
uniformly in direct response to brutal and highly salient sex 
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crimes.146 Fear that such atrocities would be repeated was the 
primary catalyst.147 Vivid cases, not statistics, generate fear.148  
Other. Sex offenders remain decidedly Other. “It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to name a group in the United States that is more reviled 
than sex offenders.”149 Sex offenders are viewed as “outsiders” and 
“monsters,” “driven by non-human, animal impulses.”150 They have 
been described by lawmakers as “the vile and the worthless.”151 
Otherness and fear can go hand in hand and connect to terrorism 
detentions. Fear of an outsider group is commonly cited as the key 
ingredient for sex offender commitment.152 Sex offenders have been 
described as “each community’s Osama bin Laden,”153 and regarded 
as “domestic terrorists.”154 
Undeterrable. It is believed that sex offenders cannot be deterred. 
They are not just “monsters”; they are monsters “incapable of making 
choices”155 and are “beyond comprehension or reform.”156 Sex 
offenders are perceived as “the new lepers: diseased, incurable, unable 
to control outbreaks.”157 Dread of these “uncontrollable monsters” 
has driven policy again. 
C. Virginia Tech Shooting 
On April 16, 2007, Seung-Hui Cho shot and killed 33 people, 
including himself, and injured about 30 others, on the Virginia 
Tech University campus.158 Cho, who had psychiatric problems, 
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had previously been found to be an “imminent danger,” but was 
ordered into outpatient rather than inpatient treatment.159 In 
response to the shooting, Virginia broadened its civil commitment 
standards, replacing the “imminent danger” requirement with a 
mere “substantial likelihood” of harm requirement.160 The impact 
of the change has been “minimal,”161 probably due to space and 
budget constraints.162 
Still, the government at least attempted to expand indefinite 
preventive detention after the Virginia Tech shooting. There was 
ample fear and horror at the nature of the crime. Perhaps more 
important, the mentally ill are almost a paradigmatic undeterrable 
Other. Less susceptible to the force of reason, the mentally ill are 
less able to modify their behavior in response to the threat of 
criminal sanction.163 They cannot control their illness, and by 
definition, it is the source of their dangerousness. In perception at 
least, mental illness is quite analogous to sexual deviance. 
Although generally not as despised as sex offenders and 
terrorists, the mentally ill are an identifiable and devalued minority 
group.164 Only 25% of people with mental health symptoms in one 
study believed that people were caring and sympathetic toward 
persons with mental illness.165 Such feelings are justified: In 
another study, 64% of Americans reported that they would be 
“definitely” or “probably” unwilling to work closely on the job 
with someone who had schizophrenia.166 
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Fear of an undeterrable Other—the mentally ill—prompted 
expansion of preventive detention authority in Virginia, but did not 
lead to a corresponding increase in detentions.167 The most likely 
explanation is that there simply were not enough beds available to 
accommodate new patients. 
III. PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION 
Will the logic of terrorist and sex offender commitment be 
expanded to other groups? In the terrorism context, expansion 
would mean expansion to citizens, who were interned in large 
numbers during World War II but not after 9/11.168 The recipe for 
expanded indefinite civil commitment is fear of an undeterrable 
Other. Arab and Muslim American citizens are an identifiable and 
devalued minority, although less disliked than illegal immigrants. 
Many in the majority continue to believe that Islam endorses 
fanaticism and terrorism—by implication, Muslims are 
undeterrable.169 Their fate would seem to turn largely on fear. That 
this group was not widely targeted for preventive detention after 
the massive 9/11 attack suggests that fear will have to be very 
intense indeed to prompt a change of course.170 It is probably not 
going to happen due to mere inattention171 or passive mission 
creep.172 
Two citizens and two non-citizens recently claimed that they 
feared indefinite government detention pursuant to a statute 
reaffirming extraordinary post-9/11 powers.173 The Second Circuit 
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rejected that claim, holding that the statute did not expand 
authority to detain citizens.174 Importantly, the court recognized 
that there might be such authority, just not based on this statute.175 
The court’s ruling with respect to the non-citizens is more 
interesting: they lacked standing because, despite arguably falling 
within the scope of the statute, “they [had] not established a basis 
for concluding that enforcement against them [was] even remotely 
likely.”176 Of course, enforcement against non-citizens with closer 
ties to terrorism may well be likely enough to establish standing, 
but the Second Circuit basically dismissed the threat that 
preventive detention would be expanded, even to non-citizens who 
had indirectly supported terrorism.177 
The first wave of sex offender commitment expressly targeted 
homosexuals; the current wave does not.178 Nonetheless, the logic of 
sex offender commitment could be expanded to other groups. John La 
Fond warned of this potential almost immediately after Washington 
adopted the first new-wave SVP law.179 His list of possible targets 
includes drunk drivers, domestic abusers, drug users, and gang 
members.180 This warning came before the Supreme Court grafted 
onto Kansas’s SVP law a control-defect requirement.181 But most 
criminals have a control defect, especially those in La Fond’s list.182 
Drug users and drunk drivers may well have impaired volition.183 
Domestic abusers, like sex offenders, could be viewed as pathological, 
not just immoral. And gang members, like the allegedly disloyal 
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Japanese of the WWII era, adhere to a code of conduct that may 
mitigate the deterrent effect of law. In other words, these criminals 
are all arguably undeterrable—not just bad, but mad.184 
That leaves Otherness and fear. Drunk drivers almost certainly 
fail the Otherness test. Seventeen million Americans admitted to 
drunk driving in 2010, including almost a quarter of people aged 
21 to 25.185 There is a powerful stigma associated with drunk 
driving, but assuming no accident occurs, the stigma is less than 
that attributed to drug use.186 Some subset of serious drug users 
may therefore be sufficiently Other. And although there is 
currently not enough fear to justify preventive detention, that could 
change with a new drug or other market shock.187 
Domestic abusers, like drunk drivers and drug users, are hard 
to identify in advance. Being identifiable, recall, is a prerequisite 
for Otherness. That may be why current practice in some 
jurisdictions is to preventively detain some domestic abusers after 
they have acted but before they are convicted of any crime.188 
Gang members, perhaps easier to identify, are treated similarly 
when bail is denied, because they are considered dangerous.189 But 
the government has at times been even more proactive regarding 
gang membership. 
Chicago’s 2000 Gang Congregation Ordinance is a good 
example. It criminalizes gang loitering, which is defined as 
loitering with intent to commit a crime.190 As written, this is 
plainly preventive: the goal is to preempt the planned crime. 
Almost 3,000 orders to disperse were issued by Chicago police 
from 2000 through October 15, 2010, over 97% to blacks or 
Hispanics.191 Blacks and Hispanics have historically been viewed 
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as Others; blacks and Hispanics who are members of gangs are 
even farther outside the mainstream.  
Among La Fond’s list of four groups, gang members would 
seem to be the only group sufficiently Other for preventive 
detention. The last ingredient is fear. To be sure, people fear gang 
members, but probably not in the same way as they fear terrorists 
or sex offenders. In 2008, about 5% of violent crime victims could 
determine that the offender or offenders were gang members.192 Of 
course, many victims do not know and many crimes go unreported. 
The FBI estimates that gangs are responsible for approximately 
48% of violent crime in most jurisdictions.193 That is a huge 
number, which could drive fear through the roof if combined with 
an increase in crime rates like the one observed in the 1960s and 
1970s.194 
In order to drive policy, however, fear must be experienced by 
those in power.195 The victims of violent crime are also 
disproportionately powerless. From 1980 to 2008, the homicide 
victimization rate for blacks was six times higher than the rate for 
whites.196 Most murders are intraracial: 84% of white victims were 
killed by whites, and 93% of black victims were killed by 
blacks.197 The Chicago dispersal order data and these figures 
together suggest that at least the most visible gang members tend 
to be black and Hispanic and prey upon individuals in the same 
groups. That only 22% or so of homicide victims were killed by 
strangers probably reduces the level of fear the in-group feels 
toward gang members.198 
A final important factor weighs against the likelihood of vast 
mission creep: cost. It would be infeasible to preventively detain, 
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even for a relatively short time, every possible drunk driver, drug 
user, domestic abuser, or gang member.199 Of course, the 
intervention could be limited to the most dangerous, as is true for 
sex offender and mental illness commitment. But the steep cost of 
incarceration tilts toward freedom. Indeed, it appears to have been 
the greatest impediment to large-scale expansion of mental illness 
civil commitment in Virginia. The ingredients may be there—at 
least after a frightening tragedy like Virginia Tech—but the long-
term, cost-saving trend of deinstitutionalization is not easily 
reversed. 
The high cost of incarceration explains why indefinite 
preventive detention has been limited to categories of people 
deemed undeterrable. In a perfect world, the threat of enforcement 
would eliminate all crime. Society would have to lock up no one. 
In our imperfect world, the hope is that locking up one wrongdoer 
discourages many others. On the other hand, preventive detention 
works only if we can accurately identify individuals who are very 
likely to commit crimes. Sex offender commitment relies on some 
of the best actuarial instruments, but few, if any, individuals can be 
confidently classified as more likely than not to commit an 
offense.200 Many—perhaps most—detained sex offenders would 
not commit a crime if released. Society is wasting money by 
keeping them locked up. 
Returning to gang members, this Article earlier suggested that 
adherence to a gang code—like being Japanese during World War 
II—might be viewed as rendering a member undeterrable. So far, 
society appears to disagree.201 The dominant law enforcement 
responses to gang violence have been focused on deterrence: more 
police202 and stiffer sentences.203 There are even serious efforts at 
intervention and rehabilitation.204 Until a jurisdiction believes these 
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measures are futile and fear escalates, it seems unlikely that there 
will be overt indefinite preventive detention of gang members. 
CONCLUSION 
Twice in the national security context and twice with sex 
offenders, the United States has preventively detained hundreds. In 
the earlier two periods, larger numbers and more types of 
individuals were detained: tens of thousands of citizens during 
World War II; and hundreds of homosexuals between the 1930s 
and 1980s. Against this backdrop, the current wars on terror and 
sex offenders seem less egregious. To be sure, they rest on 
dangerously elastic legal concepts that could expand to cover other 
groups. But the likelihood of such expansion may be somewhat 
less than previously suggested. 
Large-scale, indefinite preventive detention has historically 
taken place in response to fear of an undeterrable Other. Fear will 
come and go. Enemies and criminals can be labeled undeterrable. 
But the types of people we consider Other may have shrunk as we 
became more diverse. When everyone is a minority, no one is.205 
The dividing line on terrorism post-9/11 was citizenship. Arab and 
Muslim American U.S. citizens were not preventively detained in 
large numbers, athough thousands of noncitizens in these groups 
were. The progress on sex offender commitment seems all but 
irreversible. It is hard to imagine this country again detaining 
people merely for being homosexual.206 
Will the current preventive detention regimes expand in other 
directions? Probably not. It must be conceded that while the 
citizenship boundary appears to be robust based on post-9/11 
actions, fear of a discrete minority of citizens could become so 
pronounced as to erase that line. In all likelihood, it will take a 
massive threat to this country. The sex offender logic could 
encompass almost any dangerous person, but no other group of 
people is as frightening and hated. Black and Hispanic gang 
members are perhaps the group most at risk, but they do not seem 
to be perceived as undeterrable. Future changes in the three key 
variables cannot be ruled out and could lead to mission creep, but 
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such changes do not appear imminent. Mission creep does not 
seem likely. 
Importantly, this Article examines just the tip of an iceberg: 
scenarios in which the government openly declares that it will 
indefinitely incarcerate people solely because they are deemed 
dangerous. That is just a small part of the “preventive state,” which 
manifests itself in many ways and is growing.207 With the 
exception of quarantine and mental-illness civil commitment, open 
preventive detention has recently expanded in existing areas and 
entered new ones.208 Immigration and criminal pre-trial 
proceedings are two important areas where overt “short-term” 
detentions have grown dramatically. This would be cause for alarm 
even without terrorism and sex offender detentions. And the rise of 
prevention has many more subtle implications. Guantanamo Bay 
and sexual predator detentions make headlines, but the growing 
threats to civil liberties lurk beneath the surface. 
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